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Abstract 
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public outrage over the attack, including covering up the action, devaluing the target, reinterpreting what is 
happening, using official processes to give an appearance of justice, and intimidating people involved. To 
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actions, validating targets, interpreting actions as unfair, mobilising support and not relying on official 
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Scientists and science under siege
In 1969, Clyde Manwell was appointed to the second chair 
of zoology at the University of Adelaide. By present-day 
terminology he was an environmentalist, but at the time 
this term was little known and taking an environmental 
stand was uncommon for a scientist. Many senior figures 
in government, business and universities saw such stands 
as highly threatening. In 1971, Manwell and his wife Ann 
Baker wrote a letter to the Adelaide Advertiser criticising 
aspects of the South Australian government’s fruit-fly 
spraying programme. The senior professor and head 
of the Department of Zoology at the university, H. G. 
Andrewartha, complained to the Vice-Chancellor, leading 
to an attempt to dismiss Manwell. The saga lasted four 
years and involved everything from inquiries to student 
protests. The attack on Manwell can be interpreted as 
serving the interests of a pesticide-industry establishment 
threatened by criticism from a reputable scientist. 
Scientists can feel under pressure, not just to do good 
research, but to conform to outside demands, sometimes 
unwelcome or even abhorrent. For example, they may 
be told to change their research directions, to keep quiet 
about findings, to alter wording in their papers or to say 
nothing while results are misrepresented. If they speak 
out, they may be threatened, reprimanded, publicly 
attacked or even lose their jobs.
Science can be said to be under siege when outside 
pressures influence or force scientists to serve goals 
other than truth and the public interest. There is plenty 
of evidence that science is and has been under siege. 
For example, in a survey of Australian scientists in the 
1990s, more than half answered yes to the question “Do 
you believe that scientists may jeopardise their career 
prospects or research funding success by speaking out on 
environmental issues?” (Wilson and Barnes 1995) — and 
less than one in five said no. Numerous environmental 
scientists have come under attack because of their 
research or speaking out about it (Kuehn 2004). On 
some topics, such as nuclear power and fluoridation, it 
can be very risky for scientists to take a view contrary 
to the dominant one (Freeman 1981; Waldbott 1965). 
In some countries, any scientific dissent that challenges 
government positions can lead to discrimination or worse 
(Schoijet and Worthington 1993). 
Overall, there is quite a lot of evidence of suppression 
of dissent (Martin 1999). It has gone on for decades, 
but most working scientists ignore it as long as it doesn’t 
affect them personally. Sometimes, though, entire 
communities become aware and concerned because of 
the blatant and wide-ranging nature of the attacks on 
scientists, such as in the US under the George W. Bush 
administration (Mooney 2005), though there is plenty 
of evidence of similar problems in earlier times (Boffey 
1975; Deyo et al. 1997; Primack and von Hippel 1974; 
Wilkinson 1998).
I will take for granted that there are ongoing pressures on 
scientists to serve vested interests. My focus here is on 
how to respond. There is surprisingly little attention to 
methods and strategies for defending dissent, by scientists 
or others. I present the backfire framework, a way of 
understanding methods used by perpetrators of perceived 
injustice. I apply this framework first to the Manwell case 
and then to the big picture of the relationship between 
powerful groups and science. In conclusion, I outline 
the normal assumptions made by apolitical scientists, 
contrasting them with a more engaged approach for 
breaking the siege.
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The backfire framework
When people think someone has done something wrong, 
they often become concerned, disgusted or outraged. 
What can the perpetrator do to minimise this adverse 
reaction? An ordinary perpetrator — a house thief, 
for example — usually can do this only by disguising 
the action or by hiding, namely not getting caught. 
Powerful perpetrators — such as governments — have 
more options. There are five main ways they can reduce 
outrage:
•	cover up the action
•	 devalue the target
•	reinterpret what happened by lying, minimising the 
consequences, blaming others or using a framework that 
puts things in a favourable light
•	use official channels that give an appearance of justice
•	intimidate or bribe people involved.
These same five sorts of methods are found in all sorts of 
arenas, including bullying, censorship, unfair dismissals, 
police beatings, massacres, torture and wars (Martin 
2007).
If you oppose the unfair treatment, you can respond to 
every one of these methods:
•	expose the action
•	validate the target
•	interpret what happened as unjust
•	avoid official channels; instead, mobilise support
•	resist intimidation and bribery.
This framework of methods provides a way of 
understanding struggles in science. First consider the 
attack on Clyde Manwell.
The Manwell case
Clyde Manwell’s apparent offence, in the eyes of his 
attackers, was to question the orthodoxy about use 
of pesticides. Others had openly criticised the fruit-fly 
spraying programme, but Manwell was the first to do so 
who had strong scientific credentials — being a professor 
of zoology at the leading university in Adelaide. Other 
critics could be dismissed as ill-informed. Manwell could 
not be so easily ignored. (For information on the Manwell 
case, see Badger 1986; Baker 1986.)
The legitimate approach would have been an open 
discussion of the issues. Professor Andrewartha could 
have approached Manwell as a peer to discuss differences. 
Or he could have written his own letter to the Adelaide 
Advertiser. Instead, he wrote to the Vice-Chancellor to 
make a complaint. Furthermore, his letter was confidential. 
So far as the wider public and scientific community were 
concerned, this was a form of cover-up: Andrewartha’s 
attack was behind the scenes.
Shortly after Manwell and Baker’s letter to the newspaper 
was published, Manwell was criticised in state parliament. 
This was a method of devaluation. For example, one of 
Manwell’s parliamentary critics, H. K. Kemp, speaking in 
the South Australian Legislative Council on 11 March 
1971, said “To see this system [of fruit fly control], which 
has been built up over the years and proved capable of 
doing the job, being capriciously endangered by the actions 
of one man, who cannot be ignorant of the implications 
of his actions, is a sad thing indeed.” Later during the 
saga, one of the members of the University Council — 
who was also a colleague in the Zoology Department — 
recommended to Manwell that he see a psychiatrist, and 
offered the names of three. Suggesting that Manwell was 
mentally ill was also a form of devaluation. 
Andrewartha’s initial letter to the Vice-Chancellor 
was entirely about Manwell’s letter to the Advertiser. 
Andrewartha followed up with another letter to the Vice-
Chancellor, raising several other matters including that 
there were errors in Manwell and Baker’s recently published 
book and that Manwell had presented inappropriate 
material in four lectures. These other matters became the 
subject of considerable scrutiny. This could be considered 
to be an attempt at reinterpretation. Andrewartha’s main 
concern was Manwell’s public criticism of pesticides; by 
introducing complaints about other aspects of Manwell’s 
performance, the attack on Manwell could proceed under 
a different guise, avoiding the key issue of free speech.
Andrewartha’s attack was made through official 
channels, namely complaints to the Vice-Chancellor. 
The University Council set up a Commission of Inquiry 
to look into the allegations. The Commission and the 
Council found that even if the allegations were true, 
they did not warrant any penalties via university rules. 
Subsequently the Council appointed a committee of 
three academics to deal with residual problems in 
the Zoology Department — but this committee never 
examined the accuracy of Andrewartha’s accusations.
Manwell also used an official channel: he sued Andrewartha 
for libel. This had the effect of reducing public discussion 
of the issues, which could be said to be sub judice. This was 
probably one of the factors that made the affair drag out: 
it was 1975 before it was resolved. The settlement of the 
case did not eliminate Manwell’s problems: he remained 
the second professor of zoology, in a department run by 
Andrewartha. Manwell did not know at the time that his 
predecessor, the previous second professor of zoology, had 
also had a conflict with Andrewartha, but in that case 
the university administration had resolved the conflict by 
moving the second professor out of the department, away 
from Andrewartha’s authority.
A primary form of intimidation in this case was the 
possibility that Manwell might be dismissed. He also 
suffered harassment, for example being denied honours 
students, having his third-year course on comparative 
biochemistry and pollution unilaterally cancelled by 
the head of department, and receiving anonymous 
threats of violence. He was also denied research 
funding (Manwell 1979).
Manwell survived. It’s worth looking at the counter-
methods he and his supporters used.
The counter to cover-up is exposure. Andrewartha’s letter 
and much else about the case were revealed in articles in 
the student newspaper On Dit.
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The counter to devaluation is validation. Manwell’s cause 
would have been assisted if prominent figures had come to 
his defence. Apparently this did not occur in parliament. 
However, a number of university colleagues privately 
complained about his treatment and 30 from outside 
Australia wrote letters in his defence.
The counter to reinterpretation is interpreting the attack as 
unjust. Manwell and Baker in their subsequent writings 
focused on their challenge to pesticide interests, relegating 
the other complaints by Andrewartha, for example about 
teaching, to secondary status.
The counter to official channels is to avoid them and 
instead to mobilise support. Powerful support for Manwell 
came from students; hundreds of them — and some staff 
members — attended a meeting and forced the closed 
Commission of Inquiry to be public. However, Manwell 
himself used official channels when he sued Andrewartha 
for libel. This limited the capacity for mobilising support 
because many people expected the courts to provide justice.
The counter to intimidation is resistance. Rather than 
giving up and leaving, or keeping quiet about his concerns 
about pesticides, Manwell refused to acquiesce. In the 
following decades he continued his criticisms of pesticides 
and agriculture more generally (Baker and Manwell 1988; 
Manwell and Baker 1988). Furthermore, he provided 
inspiration to many others by writing articles about 
suppression (e.g. Manwell 1978) and corresponding with 
other dissidents in science (Hawkeswood 2010). Manwell 
and Baker helped put suppression of dissent in science on 
the map in Australia (Martin et al. 1986).
The Manwell case is full of complexities — as indeed 
are most cases. I have not addressed many of the factors 
involved, for example the personalities of key individuals. 
In describing a case such as this, there is a risk of giving 
a picture that is one-dimensional, with one side — the 
dissident and supporters — portrayed as virtuous and 
flawless and the other side — the attackers — portrayed 
as nasty schemers. Actually, in struggles of this sort all 
participants commonly believe they are doing the right 
thing. Andrewartha should be remembered for more than 
his conflict with Manwell: he was a prominent scientist who 
made significant contributions to population ecology (Birch 
and Browning 1993). My aim in using the Manwell case is 
to illustrate methods used in struggles involving dissent.
Advice for dissidents
To be able to defend dissent, it’s useful to see beyond the 
peculiarities of individual cases to the regular patterns and 
to develop an effective strategy.
Any scientist can come under attack. Public dissidents are 
simply at greater risk. Others are targeted because of their 
race, gender or personal style, are picked on by a bully or 
simply are in the wrong place at the wrong time. Scientists 
who think “It couldn’t happen to me” are especially 
vulnerable when it does.
 To begin, it is useful to understand that power 
struggles in science are like power struggles anywhere: 
the game is about power, not rationality. Be prepared for 
the other side to play unfairly. In Manwell’s court case, 
the university accused Baker of working too many hours 
and produced a carbon copy of a typed contract showing 
a stipulated condition at the bottom. Luckily for Baker, 
she was able to produce the original — and the stipulated 
condition was not there. Someone had falsified the 
carbon copy. These days this sort of thing would be done 
electronically.
Be prepared for the other side to use the five methods of 
inhibiting outrage: cover-up, devaluation, reinterpretation, 
official channels, and intimidation — and be prepared to 
counter each of these methods. Quite a few dissidents 
acquiesce too easily and play their opponents’ game.
The fewer people who know about the attack, the more 
easily perpetrators can get away with it. Many targets are 
reluctant to speak out, often because they are embarrassed 
or humiliated by what is being done to them. They hope 
things will improve without publicity — so they keep 
quiet. Alternatively, they might make a complaint to a 
superior, write a letter to a professional body or make a 
complaint to a grievance body — in other words, they 
hope for justice within the system using official channels. 
These are two common responses, and they are seldom 
effective. They are usually quite helpful to the attacker.
I’ve talked to numerous whistleblowers who think their 
own cases are different: they know truth is on their side 
and that anyone can see it, so they believe going to the 
ombudsman or some other agency will vindicate them. 
Nine times out of ten, they’re wrong (De Maria 1999). 
Truth is not enough.
For most scientists responding to attack, the most 
common mistakes — from the point of view of the 
backfire model — are acquiescing in cover-up and relying 
on official channels. However, taking the issue to wider 
audiences doesn’t have to mean media coverage. A 
typical sequence of actions in mobilising support is to 
approach colleagues, meet with a few friends, develop a 
plan of action, prepare a short factual summary of events, 
show it to a few people to check it and see how well it 
communicates, circulate it to a selected distribution list, 
gather information about what’s happening at work, take 
stock of the state of play and plan for the next step — if 
needed. Such a small-scale mobilisation of support helps 
to expose information in a controlled fashion, provides 
validation by bringing supporters on board, challenges 
the attacker’s interpretation, avoids official channels and 
resists intimidation.
Dramatic, high-stakes attacks, such as the one against 
Manwell, are rare. Much more common are subtle forms 
of harassment and disadvantaging, such as difficulty in 
getting access to equipment, delays in obtaining approvals, 
heavier-than-usual teaching loads, derogatory rumours 
and unfair rejection of papers. Because these sorts of 
problems happen so often anyway, it’s hard to prove any of 
these constitutes suppression of dissent. Manwell suffered 
a lot of this low-key harassment too.
Perhaps the most important step for anyone who feels 
under attack is to seek advice and support. Many targets 
start believing what others say about them. It’s valuable to 
obtain opinions and help from others.
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Many scientists are fortunate enough to go through their 
entire career and never experience a serious attack. 
This means it is hard to comprehend what’s involved 
and sometimes hard to empathise with those who are 
attacked. Suffice it to say that it is far more traumatic than 
most people can imagine. 
Many whistleblowers who suffer reprisals lose their jobs 
and sometimes their careers, but this is only part of the 
story: their health suffers, their relationships are put 
under severe stress and sometimes falter, and their very 
understanding of the world is thrown into turmoil. Prior 
to speaking out, many whistleblowers were conscientious, 
successful performers who believed the system worked. 
When suddenly they are attacked for doing a public 
service, their faith in the world is shattered, with no ready 
alternative (Alford 2001).
If one of your colleagues is under attack, you can provide a 
valuable service by trying to understand what it’s like and, 
if they are willing to talk about it, by just listening. Doing 
more than this to help is valuable too, but you need to be 
careful: by supporting someone who has been targeted, 
you might become a target too.
Because only a few scientists come under direct attack, 
there’s very little collective wisdom about how to respond. 
It would be like doing an experiment the very first time — 
you have to be lucky to get it to work, because usually trial 
and error are needed. But serious attacks are so rare that 
gaining experience is difficult. Therefore it is personally 
valuable to help a colleague or send a note of support to 
someone you’ve heard about through a media story.
One of the key elements of attacks is intimidation. Many 
targets are so frightened that they retreat, unwilling to 
stand up for themselves. However, the bigger impact of 
attacks is on third parties, namely everyone else who sees 
what happens and becomes afraid to step out of line. The 
way to challenge this is to resist. The same demonstration 
effect applies: each person who resists and develops 
an effective strategy becomes an inspiration to others. 
Manwell’s resistance inspired many at the time and 
continues to be an example of how to oppose suppression 
of dissent.
When under attack, sometimes the wisest strategy is not 
to resist, instead acquiescing or leaving. Each individual 
has to weigh various factors, including the risk to their 
career, their psychological resources, likely allies and 
opponents, and consequences for colleagues and families. 
There is no single course of action best for everyone in 
every circumstance. 
When a scientist does decide to fight, there are no 
guarantees. Even the best methods may not be enough 
against a powerful opponent. What can be said, though, 
is that studies of many struggles offer some general 
principles that make success more likely. The single 
guiding principle is to mobilise support. That means 
documenting the case carefully and accurately and 
making information known to others. It means behaving 
ethically, because that is more likely to win support in the 
long run. It means being clear about the issues at stake 
and concentrating on the ones of broad significance. It 
means not relying on official channels, because they put 
the matter in forums where wider support is less relevant. 
It means refusing to be intimidated, demonstrating to 
others that resistance is possible.
For a single scientist to resist attack is important, both 
personally and for inspiring others. But the challenges for 
science go beyond individual attacks. It is time to look at a 
broader picture using the same strategic framework.
Science under siege: the bigger 
picture
The common picture of science is that it is neutral. 
Scientists are searching for the truth, not to serve 
any particular agenda. As long as scientists verify their 
findings and publish them, their job is done. Cases such 
as Manwell’s are unwelcome departures from the norm.
There’s another picture: knowledge and power are 
inevitably intermixed. Powerful groups — governments 
and large corporations — fund research areas they are 
interested in. They pick the results that serve their 
interests and ignore others. This is what is meant by 
the saying that “science is political” (Arditti et al. 1980; 
Dickson 1984; Rose and Rose 1976a, b). 
The status of scientific research depends heavily on its 
image as being neutral. People are more likely to trust 
science if it is seen as independent of vested interests. 
Therefore, powerful patrons of science have much to 
gain by hiding or legitimising their role. If people realised 
research agendas are being shaped by special interests, 
they might be upset. So it can be predicted that the 
powerful patrons of science will use the five methods of 
inhibiting outrage.
Cover-up The attention in scientific journals and media 
accounts is almost entirely on research that is actually 
done. There is far less attention to research that isn’t 
done. If funding is available in an area, scientists can be 
found to work on it; if there’s no funding, few scientists 
will take the initiative to pursue it. The result is that there 
are whole areas of what can be called “undone science” 
(Hess 2006). For example, there’s lots of medical funding 
for diseases in rich countries and relatively little for far 
more lethal diseases affecting poor people. There is vastly 
more funding for new drugs than into uses of substances 
that can’t be patented. There is far more funding for 
centralised energy sources like nuclear power and coal 
than for energy efficiency and decentralised renewable 
energy sources. There are lots of neglected research 
areas — areas of undone science — but this process and 
consequence are usually invisible.
Devaluation Critics of the way science operates, especially 
those who question the power structure of science, are 
portrayed as political, even as “anti-science.” Dissidents 
of all sorts are dismissed as unscientific.
The scientists who are valued, in the normal conception, are 
those who keep quiet and do their jobs, even if that means 
taking grants from corporations whose products they are 
studying. Conflicts of interest are seldom a source of concern 
as long as they are in the service of powerful groups.
168
Martin
Science under Siege
Going public is somehow seen to demean the credibility 
of a scientist as a scientist, in the eyes of other scientists. 
Those who popularise science are usually seen as less 
serious about their research.
Reinterpretation Scientists carry out their work through 
a set of conventions about how the world works, how 
research should be done and how to present the findings. 
Thomas Kuhn’s idea of a scientific paradigm captured this 
idea. Subsequent scholars have qualified and modified 
Kuhn’s conception, but the basic insight remains: scientists 
approach their task through a set of preconceptions or 
assumptions. These provide criteria for assessing what 
counts as good research and valid knowledge.
What Kuhn and most of his successors left out of the 
picture is the connection between prevailing sets of 
scientific ideas and powerful groups in society. An industry 
can provide funding and potential jobs for those who 
adopt a research programme that is industry-friendly, 
with potential dangers awaiting those who challenge the 
programme. Manwell learned this when he questioned 
what could be called the pesticide paradigm, a framework 
for research in the field in which questions about the 
effectiveness of pesticides were legitimate but alternative 
ways of dealing with pests were not. 
Scientists adhering to the dominant way of thinking 
about issues are completely sincere. That is what makes 
paradigms so effective: they infiltrate the very criteria that 
scientists use to assess the significance of problems, the 
appropriateness of research methods and the characteristics 
of knowledge. It makes them acutely sensitive to the 
weaknesses of alternative approaches while often unaware 
of the shortcomings of their own viewpoints.
This process is most effective when paradigms and 
powerful interests are closely aligned, as with genetic 
engineering. However, sometimes there is a clash, as 
with climate change, in which the dominant scientific 
view is contrary to the interests of the fossil fuel industry. 
Scientists who question climate-change orthodoxy receive 
far more attention — and industry support — than those 
who question genetic engineering orthodoxy. (On the 
latter, see Delborne 2008.)
Official channels Scientific journals, scientific societies 
and research organisations serve to define the appropriate 
way to do science. An orthodox scientific career operates 
within a standard pattern of taking courses, apprenticeship 
as a research student and jobs as scientists. It is rare for 
anyone to succeed in science following a different path, 
for example being self-taught or researching outside the 
conventional career structure. Publishing outside the 
standard journals offers little credibility.
The standard system makes it easier for scientists to 
accept the role of dominant groups — governments, big 
corporations and scientific elites — in setting research 
agendas and criteria for acceptable knowledge. Within the 
official system, researchers with different agendas often 
have to struggle for credibility.
There are alternatives. In community research, done by 
activists and community members to pursue topics of local 
relevance, there is attention to environmental, health and 
social issues often neglected by mainstream science.
Suppression Those who challenge the system are at risk of 
being attacked. Dissent is welcomed as long as it is within 
the system parameters. The Manwell case is just one of 
thousands.
Responding
Given this picture of the power dynamics of science, what 
does it imply for working scientists? First consider the 
normal assumptions of scientists who are apolitical: they 
would prefer to ignore power dynamics and get on with 
their research. Here are some typical attitudes:
•	My job is to do good science.
•	If my research has social relevance, my task is to present 
the facts. I shouldn’t be political.
•	I should leave judgements and struggles to others.
•	If, despite my caution, I come under attack, then 
I’ll acquiesce, namely change my research or keep a 
lower profile.
These sorts of attitudes are typical of the loyal employee 
who believes those running the enterprise are capable and 
trustworthy. Scientists often see the “enterprise” as science 
itself and believe their loyalty is to its normal operation.
This would be fine if science, as a social institution, was 
indeed a dispassionate search for the truth. But if, instead, 
powerful groups are shaping and benefiting from the way 
science is organised — and benefiting from the perception 
that science is neutral — then the typical attitudes serve 
these powerful groups. 
Consider then an alternative approach, based on 
challenging each of the five methods of inhibiting outrage.
•	Expose what science is and isn’t done. For example, 
reveal the role of military or corporate sponsors and 
point out areas of public interest where little research 
is being done.
•	Validate scientists who do research and speak out in the 
public interest. For example, point out that they are free 
of conflicts of interest affecting other scientists.
•	Question assumptions underpinning conventional 
research. Explain how paradigms can be aligned with 
the interests of powerful groups.
•	Mobilise for change and don’t rely on scientific elites 
to do it.
•	Resist attacks and help others to resist.
When large numbers of scientists mount a challenge 
along these lines, it often means supporting a social 
movement. Very occasionally, scientist-activists become a 
social movement themselves.
•	Scientists in several countries in the 1940s and 1950s 
mobilised for science in the public interest. However, 
these movements were crushed by governments in the 
emerging cold war.
•	Scientists have supported environmental campaigns for 
decades. Indeed, some environmental research preceded 
and helped stimulate the rise of the environmental 
movement in the 1960s.
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•	Scientists and engineers critical of nuclear power were 
crucial players in anti-nuclear campaigns from the 
1960s onwards. 
•	Scientist critics of the US “star wars” anti-missile system 
proposed in the 1980s campaigned in parallel with the 
anti-nuclear-war movement of the time.
•	Scientists have played key roles in challenging dangers 
from tobacco, lead and other substances, taking on 
powerful industries.
•	Climate change scientists have confronted a vociferous 
denial campaign underwritten by fossil fuel interests.
•	Outspoken scientists have challenged the Bush 
administration’s pressures to manipulate science for 
corporate goals.
Many of these campaigns seem to be mainly about the 
applications of science. But the struggles sometimes 
got down to the level of hypotheses and data analysis. 
For example, the debate over nuclear power included 
disagreements about the effect of low-level ionising 
radiation, including the shape of the dose-response curve 
(Diesendorf 1982).
The historical pattern seems to be that science is always 
under siege, in the sense that powerful groups want science 
to serve their special interests at the expense of wider social 
goals. However, few scientists recognise this as much of a 
problem, because of the methods of inhibiting outrage: the 
influences on science are hidden, dissidents are devalued, 
the job of scientists is perceived to be doing good science, 
scientific elites are available to take care of the politics, 
and challengers are intimidated. In a few periods, though, 
there is a wider perception of threat, when the pressures 
become too blatant or when scientists become aware and 
empowered by mobilisations in other parts of society. In 
other words, when citizens become concerned about an 
issue, their concern can rub off on scientists.
Conclusions
Individual scientists occasionally come under direct attack 
because of their research or public statements. This is 
often a tremendous shock, and it is not obvious what to do 
because it doesn’t happen often — and who would want 
to gain experience by repeatedly coming under attack? 
Therefore, it is wise to learn from what happens to others. 
In a wide range of injustices, powerful perpetrators 
regularly use the same sorts of methods: they hide their 
actions, devalue the target, reinterpret what happened 
in ways that minimise consequences and blame 
others, use official channels to give an appearance 
of justice, and intimidate or bribe people involved. 
By recognising these methods and countering each 
one of them, it is possible to be more effective in 
resistance. This doesn’t make the struggle easy, nor is 
it a guarantee of success, but it can increase the odds 
of being effective. It’s also important to know when to 
acquiesce and when to resist.
However, pressures on science are not just on individuals 
— they are systemic. Science has always been shaped 
by social forces, especially by powerful patrons. Today 
that means mostly governments and corporations that 
fund research. Usually this state of affairs seems normal. 
By using a variety of techniques, dominant groups — 
including most scientific elites — minimise awareness and 
concern about the way scientific agendas are shaped.
The idea that science can be pure and separate from society 
is an illusion. Research is always embedded in society: it 
is funded from social resources, it is carried out by social 
beings (scientists are human), its agendas are influenced 
by prevailing ideas and it has social consequences. The 
goal should not be a pure, independent science but 
rather a science that is shaped by and serves a desirable 
conception of society.
Science is inherently contentious, just as the way society 
operates is inherently contentious. That means scientists 
need to make choices. The default option is to accept the 
way things are, without questioning or resistance. The more 
active option is to take a stand. And if you’re going to take a 
stand, you should try to be as effective as possible. 
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